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Abstract
In many common interactive scenarios, participants lack information about other
participants, and specifically about the preferences of other participants. In this work,
we model an extreme case of incomplete information, which we term games with type
ambiguity, where a participant lacks even information enabling him to form a belief
on the preferences of others. Under type ambiguity, one cannot analyze the scenario
using the commonly used Bayesian framework, and therefore one needs to model the
participants using a different decision model.
To this end, we present the MINthenMAX decision model under ambiguity. This
model is a refinement of Wald’s MiniMax principle, which we show to be too coarse for
games with type ambiguity. We characterize MINthenMAX as the finest refinement
of the MiniMax principle that satisfies three properties we claim are necessary for
games with type ambiguity. This prior-less approach we present here also follows the
common practice in computer science of worst-case analysis.
Finally, we define and analyze the corresponding equilibrium concept, when all
players follow MINthenMAX. We demonstrate this equilibrium by applying it to
two common economic scenarios: coordination games and bilateral trade. We show
that in both scenarios, an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists, and we analyze
the equilibria.
Keywords: Decision making under ambiguity, Games with ambiguity, Wald’s MiniMax
principle, MINthenMAX decision model, MINthenMAX equilibrium
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1 Introduction
In many common interactive scenarios participants lack information about other partici-
pants, and specifically about the preferences of other participants. The extreme case of
such partial information scenario is termed ambiguity,1 and in our case ambiguity about
the preferences of other participants. In these scenarios, not only does a participant not
know the preferences of other participants, but he cannot even form a belief on them (that
is, he lacks the knowledge to form a probability distribution over preferences). Hence, one
cannot analyze the scenario using the Bayesian framework, which is the common practice
for analyzing partial-information scenarios, and new tools are needed.2 Similarly, in the
computer science literature, algorithms, agents, and mechanisms are often analyzed without
assuming a distribution on the input space or on the environment. In this work, we define
and analyze equilibria under ambiguity about the the game. In particular, we concentrate
on equilibria of games with type ambiguity, i.e., games with ambiguity about the other play-
ers’ preferences, namely, their type. Our equilibrium definition is based on a refinement of
Wald’s MiniMax principle, which corresponds to the common practice in computer science
of worst-case analysis.
In Section 2, we define a general model of games with ambiguity, similar to Harsanyi’s
model of games with incomplete information [17],3 and derive from it the special case of games
with type ambiguity. In this model, the knowledge of player i on player j is represented by
a set of types T . Player i knows that the type of player j belongs to T , but has no prior
distribution on this set, and no information that can be used to construct one. Our model
also enables us to apply the extensive literature on knowledge, knowledge operators, and
knowledge hierarchy to ambiguity scenarios.
Next, we present a novel model for decision making under ambiguity: MINthenMAX
preferences. We characterize MINthenMAX in the general framework of decision making
under partial information, and show MINthenMAX is the unique finest preference that
satisfies a few natural properties. Specifically, we claim that these properties are satisfied
by rational players in games with type ambiguity, and hence that MINthenMAX is the right
tool of analysis.
Finally, we derive the respective equilibrium concept, dubbed MINthenMAX-NE, and
present some of its properties, both in the context of the general model of games with type
ambiguity and in two common economic scenarios.
1In decision theory literature, the terms “ambiguity,” “pure ambiguity,” “complete ignorance,” “uncer-
tainty” (as opposed to “risk”), and “Knightian uncertainty” are used interchangeably to describe this case
of unknown probabilities.
2Clearly, if a player has information that he can use to construct a belief about the others, we expect the
player to use it. In this work, we study the extreme case in which one has no reason to assume the players
hold such a belief.
3As described, for example, in [23, Def. 10.37 p. 407].
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Wald’s MiniMax principle
A common model for decision making under ambiguity is the MiniMax principle presented
by Wald [30], which we refer to as MIN preferences (as distinct from the MINthenMAX
preferences that we present later).4 In the MIN model, similarly to worst-case analysis in
computer science, the preference of the decision maker over actions is based solely on the
set of possible outcomes. E.g., in games with type ambiguity, the possible outcomes are the
consequence of playing the game with the possible types of the other players. An action
a is preferred to another action b if the worst possible outcome (for the decision maker) of
taking action a is better than the worst outcome of taking action b. This generalizes the
classic preference maximization model: if there is no ambiguity, there is a unique outcome
for each action, and the MIN decision model coincides with preference maximization. The
MIN model has been used for analyzing expected behavior in scenarios of decision making
under ambiguity. For example, ambiguity about parameters of the environment, such as
the distribution of prizes (the multi-prior model) [16] and ambiguity of the decision maker
about his own utility [9]. The MIN model was also applied to define higher-order goals
for a DM, like regret minimization [27, Ch. 9] which is applying MIN when the utility of
the DM is the regret comparing to other possible actions. In addition, MIN has been used
for analyzing interactive scenarios with ambiguity, e.g., first-price auctions under ambiguity
both of the bidders and of the seller about the ex-ante distribution of bidders’ values [8], and
for designing mechanisms assuming ambiguity of the players about the ex-ante distribution
of the other players’ private information [31], or assuming they decide according the regret
minimization model [18].
As we show shortly, the MIN decision model is too coarse and offers too little predictive
value in some scenarios involving ambiguity about the other players’ types. We show a
natural scenario (a small perturbation of the Battle of the Sexes game [21, Ch. 5 Sec. 3]) in
which almost all action profiles are Nash equilibria according to MIN. Hence, we are looking
for a refinement of the MIN model that breaks indifference in some reasonable way in cases
in which two actions result in equivalent worst outcomes. In Section 3, we show that na¨ıvely
breaking indifference by applying MIN recursively5 does not suit scenarios with ambiguity
about the other players’ types either. We present two game scenarios, and we claim that
they are equivalent in a very strong sense: a player cannot distinguish between these two
scenarios, even if he has enough information to know the outcomes of all of his actions.
Hence, we claim that a rational player should act the same way in these two scenarios. Yet,
we show that if a player follows the recursive MIN decision model he plays differently in the
two scenarios. In general, we claim that a decision model for scenarios with type ambiguity
should not be susceptible to this problem, i.e., it should instruct the player to act the same
way in scenarios if the player cannot distinguish between them. Otherwise, when a decision
4Wald’s principle measures actions by their losses rather than by gains like we do here. Hence, Wald
dubbed this principle, which aims to maximize the worst (minimal) gain, the MiniMax principle while we
dub it MIN.
5I.e., when the decision maker faces two actions that have equivalent worst outcomes, he decides according
to the second-worst outcome.
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rule depends on information which is not visible to the DM, we find it to be ill-defined.6
The MINthenMAX decision model
In this work we suggest a refinement of Wald’s MiniMax principle that is not suscepti-
ble to the above-mentioned problems, and which we term MINthenMAX. According to
MINthenMAX the decision maker (DM) picks an action having an optimal worst outcome
(just like under MIN), and breaks indifference according to the best outcome. We char-
acterize MINthenMAX as the unique finest refinement of MIN that satisfies three desired
properties (Section 3): monotonicity in the outcomes, state symmetry, and independence
of irrelevant information. Monotonicity in the outcomes is a natural rationality assumption
stating that the DM (weakly) prefers an action a to an action b if in every state of the world
(in our framework, a state is a vector of types of the other players), action a results in an
outcome that is at least as good as the outcome of action b in this state. State symme-
try asserts that the decision should not depend on the names of the states and should not
change if the names are permuted. Independence of irrelevant information asserts that the
DM should not be susceptible to the irrelevant information bias, describes above. That is,
the DM’s decision should depend only on state information that is relevant to his utility.
Specifically, it requires that if two states of the world have the same outcomes for each of the
actions, the distinction between the two should be irrelevant for the DM, and his preference
over actions should not change in case he considers these two states as a single state. We
show that these properties characterize the family of preferences that are determined by only
the worst and the best outcomes of the actions. Moreover, we show that MINthenMAX
is the finest refinement of MIN in this family: for any preference P that satisfies the three
properties, if P is a refinement of MIN,7 then MINthenMAX is a refinement of P.
Equilibrium under MINthenMAX preferences
In Section 2, we define MIN-NE to be the Nash equilibria under MIN preferences, that is,
the set of action profiles in which each player best-responds to the actions of other players,
and similarly we define MINthenMAX-NE to be the Nash equilibria under MINthenMAX
preferences.
We show that for every game with ambiguity, a MIN-NE in mixed strategies always
exists (Thm. 4). On the other hand, we show that there are generic games with ambiguity
in which the set of MIN-NE is unrealistic and too large to be useful. This holds even for
cases in which the ambiguity is symmetric (all players have the same partial knowledge) and
is only about the other players’ preferences. Here once again is our motivation for studying
the equilibria under MINthenMAX. On the other hand, we present a simple generic two-
player game with type ambiguity for which no MINthenMAX-NE exists. We note that since
6This assumption is with accordance to our assumption of ambiguity which in particular assumes there
is no information on the world except the information on outcomes.
7That is, for any two actions a and b, if a is strongly preferred to b according to MIN, then a is strongly
preferred to b according to P too.
3
MINthenMAX is the unique finest refinement of MIN (which satisfies some properties), the
equilibria of a game with ambiguity under any other refinement of MIN is a super-set of the
set of MINthenMAX-NE. Hence, one can think of MINthenMAX-NE as the set of equilibria
that do not depend on assumptions on the tie-breaking rule over MIN applied by the players.
We show that the problem of finding a MIN-NE is a PPAD-complete problem [25, 26],
just as finding a Nash equilibrium when there is no ambiguity.8
Applications of MINthenMAX-NE to economic scenarios
To understand the benefits of analysis using the MINthenMAX model, we apply the equilib-
rium concept MINthenMAX-NE to two well studied economic scenarios – coordination games
and bilateral trade games – while introducing ambiguity. We show that in both scenarios, a
MINthenMAX-NE in pure strategies always exists, and we analyze these equilibria.
Coordination games
In coordination games, the players simultaneously choose a location for a common meeting.
All players prefer to choose a location that maximizes the number of players they meet, but
they differ in their tie-breaking rule, i.e., their preference over the possible locations. This is
a generalization of the game battle of the sexes [21, Ch. 5, Sec. 3], and it models economic
scenarios where the players need to coordinate a common action, like agreeing on a meeting
place, choosing a technology (e.g., cellular company), and locating a public good when the
cost is shared, as well as Schelling’s focal point experiments [28, pp. 54–57]: the parachuters’
problem and the meeting in NYC problem.
Take for example, a linear street with four possible meeting locations: LL, L, R, and RR
(see figure for the distances between the locations), and two players who choose locations
simultaneously in an attempt to meet each other.
ONMLHIJKLL 10 GFED@ABCL 9 GFED@ABCR 8 ONMLHIJKRR
Both players prefer the meeting to take place, but have different preferences over the meeting
places (and both are indifferent about their action if the meeting does not take place). We
also assume that the preference of each player is determined by the distance between the
meeting place and his initial position.9
Next, consider a scenario in which each player might be positioned in any one of the four
locations, but he does not know the position of the other player; i.e., both have ambiguity
about the type of the other player (and hence about his preference).
8When there is no ambiguity, a Nash equilibrium is also a MIN-NE of the game and vice-versa. Hence,
finding a MIN-NE is a PPAD-hard problem. We show it belongs to PPAD and so adding ambiguity does
not make the problem harder.
9For example, the preference of a player whose position is L is L ≻ R ≻ LL ≻ RR.
For clarity, in this example we use position for the initial position of a player determining his preference,
and location for the actions and outcomes.
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First, we notice that profiles in which both players choose, regardless of their types, the
same location are MINthenMAX-NE of the game. From the perspective of Player 2, if all
the types of Player 1 choose the same location, then choosing this location and meeting
Player 1 for sure is strictly preferred (regardless of the position of Player 2) to any other
choice, which would surely result in no meeting. The analysis for Player 1 is identical, hence
these profiles are MINthenMAX-NE.
Next, consider a case in which Player 1 goes either to LL or to RR (i.e., the locations
chosen by the types of Player 1 are these two locations). From Player 2’s perspective, all of
his actions are equivalent in terms of their worst outcome, as there is always a possibility of
not meeting Player 1 (when facing a type of Player 1 who chose a different location). Thus,
Player 2 chooses according to the best outcome for him. Only the actions LL and RR result
in a possibility to meet Player 1, i.e., to meet one of the types of Player 1. Hence Player 2
strictly prefers LL and RR to L and R, and so he will choose between LL and RR according
to his preference over them. Following this reasoning, we show that the profile in which
each type of each of the players goes to the location closest to him out of LL and RR is
MINthenMAX-NE, and that any other profile in which one of the players plays LL and RR
(i.e., the locations played by his types are these two locations) is not MINthenMAX-NE.
This simple scenario also demonstrates the drawback of using the MIN model to analyze
games with type ambiguity. When Player 1 goes to either LL or RR, Player 2 is indifferent
between the worst outcomes of all of his actions, and so, according to the MIN model, Player 2
is indifferent between all of his actions. Particularly, Player 2 of type LL is indifferent between
playing LL (which is his own position), playing RR (the location farthest from him), and
playing L (in which he is certain not to meet Player 1). This seems highly unrealistic: we
would expect a rational Player 2 of type LL to prefer playing LL to RR or L. When using
the MIN model to analyze equilibria we get that almost all profiles are MIN-NE10 including,
for instance, the profile in which each type goes to the location farthest from him among
LL and RR.
We show that in general, for every coordination game with type ambiguity, the pure Nash
equilibria of the no-ambiguity case in which all players choose the same unique location are
also MINthenMAX-NE.11 Note that the set of equilibria when there is no ambiguity does
not depend on the players’ types (which are only a tie-breaking rule between two locations
having the same number of other players). Yet, we get that ambiguity about the types gives
rise to new equilibria, which we characterize in Section 5. We show that an equilibrium is
uniquely defined by a set of meeting locations (LL and RR in the example above) to be
the action profile in which each type of each player chooses his optimal location in the set.
Finally, we also characterize the equilibria for several cases in which we assume a natural
homogeneity constraint on the type sets. The constraint we choose, taking the type sets
to be single-peaked consistent w.r.t. a line, restricts the ambiguity about the other players’
10In general, for a coordination game over m locations and n players s.t. each of them has at least t types,
more than (1− 1/mt−1)n-fraction of the pure action profiles are MIN-NE of the game.
11In general, if an action profile a is a Nash equilibrium for all the possible combinations of types, then
a is also a MINthenMAX-NE, since we expect the players to follow the action profile when the information
about the types is irrelevant to their decision.
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preferences in a natural way, and hence its impact on the set of equilibria is informative for
the study of equilibria under type ambiguity.
Bilateral trade
The second scenario we analyze is bilateral trade. These are two-player games between a
seller owning an item and a buyer who would like to purchase the item. Both players are
characterized by the value they attribute to the item (their respective willingness to accept
and willingness to pay). In the mechanism that we analyze, both players simultaneously
announce a price and if the price announced by the buyer is higher than the one announced
by the seller, then a transaction takes place and the price is the average of the two.12 For
simplicity, we assume that a player has the option not to participate in the trade.13
When there is no ambiguity, an equilibrium that includes a transaction consists of a single
price, which is announced by both players. When there is ambiguity about the values, we
show that, in addition to the single-price equilibrium, a new kind of equilibrium emerges.
For instance, consider the case in which the value of the buyer can be any value between 20
and 40 and the value of the seller can be any value between 10 and 30. First, we notice that
there are equilibria that are based on one price as above,14 but in any such equilibrium there
will be types (either of the buyer or of the seller) that will prefer not to participate. If, for
example, the price is 25 or higher, then there are types of the buyer that value the item at
less than this price and will prefer not to participate; similarly, for prices below 25 there are
possible sellers who value the item at more than 25 and hence will prefer not to participate.
We can show further a MINthenMAX-NE with two prices, 15 and 35, in which both players
participate regardless of their type: the seller announces 35 if his value is higher than 15 and
15 otherwise, and the buyer announces 35 if his value is higher than 35 and 15 otherwise.15
In this profile, a buyer who values the item at more than 35 prefers buying the item at either
price to not buying it, and hence he best-responds by announcing 35 and buying the item
for sure. A buyer who values the item at less than 35 prefers buying the item at 15 to not
buying it, and not buying the item to buying it at 35. The best worst-case outcome he can
guarantee is not buying the item (e.g., by announcing any value between 15 and his value).
Based on the worst outcome the buyer is indifferent between these announcements. Hence,
in choosing between these announcements according to the best-outcome (i.e., meeting a
seller who announces 15), he best-responds by announcing 15. A similar analysis shows that
also the seller best-responds in this profile.
We characterize the set of MINthenMAX-NE for bilateral trade games, and in partic-
ular we show that for every bilateral trade game, an equilibrium consists of at most two
12Our result also holds for a more general case than setting the price to be the average.
13This option is equivalent to the option of the seller declaring an extremely high price that will not be
matched (and similarly for the buyer).
14An equilibrium in which both players choose (as a function of their value) either to announce a price
common to both or not to participate.
15I.e., the seller announces the lower of the two if both are acceptable to him, and the higher otherwise;
and the buyer announces the higher of the two if both are acceptable to him, and the lower otherwise.
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prices. As a corollary we characterize the cases for which there exists a full-participation
MINthenMAX-NE, i.e., equilibria in which both players choose to participate regardless of
their value (but their bid in these equilibria might depend on the value).
2 Model
We derive our model for games with type ambiguity as a special case of a more general model
of games with ambiguity. A game with ambiguity16 is a vector〈
N ,
(
Ai
)
i∈N
,Ω,
(
ui
)
i∈N
,
(
T i
)
i∈N
〉
where:
•
〈
N , (Ai)i∈N
〉
is an n-player game form. That is,
N is a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n};
Ai is a finite set of actions of player i, and we denote by A the set of action
profiles ×i∈NAi.
• Ω is a finite set of states of the world.
• ui : Ω × A → ℜ is a utility function for player i that specifies his utility from every
state of the world and profile of actions. We identify ui with its linear extension to
mixed actions, ui : Ω×∆(Ai)→ ℜ, where ∆ (Ai) is the set of mixed actions over Ai.17
•
〈
N ,Ω, (T i)i∈N
〉
is an Aumann model of incomplete information. That is, T i is a
partition of Ω to a finite number of partition elements (Ω = ∪˙ti∈T it
i). We refer to
ti ∈ T i as a type of player i.18
The above is commonly known by the players. A game proceeds as follows.
• Nature chooses (arbitrarily) a state of the world ω ∈ Ω.
• Each player is informed (only) about his own partition element ti ∈ T i satisfying
ω ∈ ti.
• The players play their actions simultaneously: Player i, knowing his type ti, selects a
(mixed) action ai ∈ ∆(Ai).
• Every player gets a payoff according to u: Player i gets ui (t, a), where a = (a1, a2, . . . , a2)
is the action profile and t = (t1, t2, . . . , t2) is the type profile.
Notice that the difference between this model and the standard model of games with incom-
plete information [17] (e.g., as described in [23, Def. 10.37 p. 407]) is that in the latter it is
assumed that the players also have posterior distributions on ti (or equivalently, they have
subjective prior distributions on Ω).
16For simplicity we define a finite game but the definitions extend to infinite cases as well. Our definitions
of preferences and results also extend under minor technical assumptions.
17An implicit assumption here is that the players hold vNM preferences, that is, they evaluate a mixed
action profile by its expectation. This does not restrict the modeling of preferences under ambiguity. Using
the terminology of Anscombe and Aumann [2], we distinguish between roulettes and horse races.
18For a full definition of Aumann’s model and its descriptive power, see, e.g., [4, 5] and [23, Def. 9.4 p. 323].
As described in [5] this model is equivalent to defining T i using signal functions and to defining them using
knowledge operators (i.e., the systematic approach).
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In this work we are interested in games with type ambiguity. In these games the states of
the world are types vectors Ω ⊆ ×ni=1T
i, i.e., the unknown information can be represented as
information on the types, and in particular any two states of the world are distinguishable
by at least one player.19 For this restricted model, we justify our choice of MINthenMAX
preferences. Note that we prove the existence of a mixed MIN-NE (Thm. 4) for every game
with ambiguity.
A strategy of a player states his action for each of his types σi : T i → ∆(Ai). Given
a type profile t = (t1, . . . , tn) and a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), we denote by t−i
the types of the players besides player i and by σ−i (t−i) their actions under t and σ. I.e.,
σ−i (t−i) = (σ1 (t1) , . . . , σi−1 (ti−1) , σi+1 (ti+1) , . . . , σn (tn)). We note that the utility of a
given type of player i is only affected by that actions taken by other players and not by
the actions of the other types player i. Hence, we assume a player chooses his action after
knowing his type and not ex-ante beforehand, and model player i’s choice of action (best-
responding to the others) as a series of independent problems, one for each of his types, of
choosing an action. We refer to these problems as the decision process carried out by a type.
2.1 Preferences under ambiguity
Decision theory ([21, Ch. 13], [15]) deals with scenarios in which a single decision maker
(DM) needs to choose an action from a given set A when his utility from an action a ∈ A
depends also on an unknown state of the world ω ∈ Ω, and so his preference is represented
by a utility function u : A×Ω→ ℜ. Player i (of type ti) looks for a response (an action) to
a profile σ−i. This response problem is of the same format as the DM problem: he needs to
choose an action while not knowing the state of the world ω (the types of his opponents t−i
and their actions σ−i (t−i) are derived from ω).
We define the two preference orders over actions, MIN and MINthenMAX, in the frame-
work of Decision Theory. We define them by defining the pair-wise comparison relation,
and it is easy to see that this relation is indeed an order. The first preference we define
corresponds to Wald’s MiniMax decision rule [30].
Definition 1 (MIN preference).
A DM strongly prefers an action a to an action a′ according to MIN, if the worst outcome
when playing a is preferred to the worst outcome of playing a′:20
min
ω∈Ω
u (a, ω) > min
ω∈Ω
u (a′, ω) .
These preferences follow the same motivation as worst-case analysis of computer science
(where a designer needs to choose an algorithm or a system to use and the expected en-
19For Bayesian settings, this assumption is without loss of generality, because we can unify two indistin-
guishable states and replace them by the respective lottery, without changing the preferences. Since here we
assume no posterior distribution, this assumption is indeed constraining.
20The MIN preference is representable by a utility function U (a) = minω∈Ω u (a, ω).
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vironment in unknown in advance21). MIN preference can also be justified as an extreme
ambiguity aversion; judging an action by the worst possible outcome ignoring the probability
of this outcome. In Section 3 (Prop. 12) we show an axiomatization of MIN preference as
the unique preference in the ambiguity aversion maxmin model presented by Gilboa and
Schmeidler [16] (i.e., that satisfies the axioms they present), which satisfies two additional
axioms we present here.
The second preference we introduce is a refinement of the MIN preference, as it breaks
ties in cases where MIN states indifference between actions.
Definition 2 (MINthenMAX preference).
A DM strongly prefers an action a to an action a′ according to MINthenMAX, if ei-
ther minω∈Ω u (a, ω) > minω∈Ω u (a
′, ω) or he is indifferent between the two respective worst
outcomes and he prefers the best outcome of playing a to the best outcome of playing a′:22{
min
ω∈Ω
u (a, ω) = min
ω∈Ω
u (a′, ω)
max
ω∈Ω
u (a, ω) > max
ω∈Ω
u (a′, ω) .
Returning to our framework of games with ambiguity, we define the corresponding best
response (BR) correspondences: MIN-BR and MINthenMAX-BR. The best response of a
(type of a) player is a function that maps any action profile of the other players to the actions
that are optimal according to the preference. It is easy to see that a best response according
to MINthenMAX is also a best response according to MIN; that is, MINthenMAX-BR is a
refinement of MIN-BR. We show that the two best response notions are well defined and
exist for any (finite) game.23
Lemma 3.24
The following best response correspondences are non-empty: pureMIN-BR, mixedMIN-BR,
pure MINthenMAX-BR, and mixed MINthenMAX-BR.
2.2 Equilibria under ambiguity
Next we define the corresponding (interim) Nash equilibrium (NE) concepts as the profiles of
strategies in which each type best-responds to the strategies of the other players. From the
definition of MINthenMAX it is clear that any equilibrium according to MINthenMAX is also
an equilibrium according to MIN. Hence we regard MINthenMAX-NE as an equilibrium-
selection notion or a refinement of MIN-NE, in cases in which we find MIN-NE to be unrea-
21Note that also the commonly used competitive-ratio is actually applying the MIN preference when we
define u (a, ω) not to be the performance of an algorithm a on an input ω, but the ratio between this
performance and the performance of an optimal all-knowing algorithm.
22The MINthenMAX preference is not representable by a utility function, for the same reason that the
lexicographic preference over ℜ2 is not representable by a utility function [22, Ch. 3.C, p. 46].
23This lemma can be easily extended to the case of an infinite number of states by assuming some structure
on the action set and the utility function.
24Proof can be found in Appendix A.
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sonable. Our main theorem for this section is showing that any game with ambiguity has
an equilibrium according to MIN (MIN-NE) in mixed strategies.25
Theorem 4.
Every game with ambiguity has a MIN-NE in mixed actions.
Proof sketch. (The full details of the proof can be found in Appendix B)
We take S to be the set of all profiles of mixed strategies of the types and define the
following set-valued function F : S → S. Given a strategy profile s, F (s) is the product of
the best responses to s (according to MIN) of the different types. We prove the existence of
a mixed MIN-NE by applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [20] to F . A fixed point of F
is a profile s satisfying s ∈ F (s); i.e., each type best-responds to the others in the profile s,
and hence s is a MIN-NE.
Since the existence of MIN-NE is the result of applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to
the best response function,26 we get as a corollary the complexity of the problem of finding
MIN-NE.
Corollary 5.
The problem of finding a MIN-NE is in PPAD [25, 26]. Moreover, it is a PPAD-complete
problem since a special case of it, namely, finding a Nash equilibrium, is a PPAD-hard
problem [11].
Next we show that there are games that with no equilibrium according to MINthenMAX.
We show that this is true even for a simple generic game: a two-player game with type
ambiguity on one side only.
Lemma 6.
There are games for which there is no MINthenMAX-NE.
Proof.
Let G be the following two-player game with two actions for each of the players. The row
player’s utility is
L R
T 0 0
B −1 1
. The column player is one of two types: either having utility
25Throughout this paper, unless stated otherwise, when we refer to MIN-NE and MINthenMAX-NE we
mean equilibria in pure actions.
26The best response correspondence can be computed in polynomial time.
BR (s) = argmaxσi minω∈Ω u
(
ω, σi, s−i
(
t−i (ω)
))
= argmaxσi minω∈Ω Ea∼σi Ca,ω for Ca,ω = u
(
ω, a, s−i
(
t−i (ω)
))
.
The maximal value a player can guarantee himself, v∗ = maxσi minω∈Ω Ea∼σi Ca,ω, is the solution to the
following program which is linear in v and σi
max v s.t. ∀w E
a∼σi
Ca,ω > v,
that can be solved in polynomial time. Given v⋆, BR (s) is the intersection of |Ω| hyperplanes of the form
Ea∼σi Ca,ω > v
∗.
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L R
T 0 1
B 0 −2
or
L R
T 0 2
B 0 −1
(and the row player does not know which).
Then, in the unique MIN-NE the first type of the column player mixes 1
2
L + 1
2
R, the
second type of the column player plays R, and the row player mixes 2
3
T + 1
3
B (all his mixed
actions give him a worst-case payoff of 0). But this is not a MINthenMAX-NE since the row
player prefers to deviate to playing B for the possibility of getting 1, and hence the game
does not have MINthenMAX-NE in mixed strategies.27
3 Axiomatization of MINthenMAX
In this section we justify using equilibria under MINthenMAX preferences for the analysis
of games with type ambiguity. To do so, we present three properties for decision making
under ambiguity and characterize MINthenMAX as the finest refinement of MIN that
satisfies them (Thm. 10). We claim that these properties are necessary for modeling deci-
sion making under ambiguity about the other players’ types. In doing so, we justify our
application of MINthenMAX-NE.
3.1 The decision-theoretic framework
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world. We characterize a preference, i.e., a total order,
of a decision maker (DM) over the action set A where an action is a function a : Ω→ ℜ that
yields a utility for each state of the world.28
Our first two properties are natural and we claim that any reasonable preference under
ambiguity should satisfy them. The first property we present is a basic rationality assump-
tion: monotonicity. It requires that if an action a results in a higher or equal utility than an
action b in all states of the world, then the DM should weakly prefer a to b.
27Technical comment: The reason Kakutani’s theorem cannot be applied here (besides its result being
wrong) is twofold:
• The best-response set is not convex:
Consider a player who has two possible pure actions, T and B, and his utility (as a function of the
action of the opponent) is
L M R
T 0 1 2
B 0 2 1
. Next, consider he faces one of three types of his opponent
who play the three actions, respectively. He is indifferent between his two actions (both give him 0 in
the worst case and 2 in the best case), but strictly prefers the two pure actions to any mixture of the
two (giving him less than 2 in the best case).
• The best-response function is not upper semi-continuous:
In the example in the lemma, when the row player faces one type that plays the pure strategy R and
another type that mixes
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
L +
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
R, his unique best response is to play T for any ǫ > 0,
but to play B for ǫ = 0.
28Replacing ℜ with any other ordered set would not change our results.
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Axiom 7 (Monotonicity).
For any two actions a and b, if a (ω) > b (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, then either the DM is
indifferent between the two or he prefers a to b.
The second property, state symmetry, states that the DM should choose between actions
based on properties of the actions and not of the states. I.e., if we permute the states’
names, his preference should not change. Since we can assume that the states themselves
have no intrinsic utility beyond the definition of the actions, this property formalizes the
property that the DM, sue to the ambiguity about the state, should satisfy the Principle of
Insufficient Reason and treat the states symmetrically.29
Axiom 8 (State symmetry).
For any two actions a and b and a bijection ψ : Ω→ Ω, if a is preferred to b, then a ◦ ψ
is preferred to b ◦ ψ (a ◦ ψ (ω) is defined to be a (ψ (ω)), i.e., the outcome of the action a in
the state ψ (ω)).
The last property we present is independence of irrelevant information. This property
requires that if the DM considers one of the states of the world as being two states, by
way of considering some new parameter, his preference should not change. We illustrate
the desirability of this property for games with type ambiguity using the following example.
Consider the following variant of the Battle of the Sexes game between Alice and Bob, who
need to decide on a joint activity: either a Bach concert (B) or a Stravinsky concert (S).
Taking the perspective of Alice, assume that she faces one of two types of Bob: BobB whom
she expects to choose B, or BobS whom she expects to choose S. Assume that Alice prefers
B, ans so her valuation of actions is
BobB BobS
B : 2 0
S : 0 1
(0 if they do not meet and 2 or 1
if they jointly go to a concert). But there might be other information Alice does not know
about Bob. For example, it might be that in case Bob prefers (and chooses) S, Alice also
does not know his favorite soccer team.30 So she might actually conceive the situation as
BobB BobS,⋆ BobS,†
B : 2 0 0
S : 0 1 1
. Since this new soccer information is irrelevant to the game,
it should not change the action of a rational player. Notice that if Alice chooses according
to the recursive MIN rule we described in the introduction, she will choose according to the
second-worst outcome and hence choose B in the first scenario and S in the second scenario.
We find a decision model of a rational player which is susceptible to this problem to be an
ill-defined model.
29Note that this property rules out any subjective expectation maximization preference, except for expec-
tation under the uniform distribution.
30Of course, his favorite soccer team is clear in case he prefers Bach.
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Axiom 9 (Independence of irrelevant information).
Let a and b be two actions on Ω s.t. a 4 b, and let ω̂ ∈ Ω be a state of the world.
Define a new state space Ω′ = Ω∪˙ {ω̂} and let a′ and b′ be two actions on Ω′ satisfying
a′ (ω) = a (ω) and b′ (ω) = b (ω) for all states ω ∈ Ω \ {ωˆ}, a′ (ω̂) = a′ (ωˆ) = a (ωˆ) , and
b′ (ω̂) = b′ (ωˆ) = b (ωˆ). Then a′ 4 b′.
We show that MINthenMAX is the finest refinement of MIN that satisfies the above
three axioms.31
Theorem 10.
MINthenMAX is the unique preference that satisfies
• Monotonicity.
• State symmetry.
• Independence of irrelevant information.
• It is a refinement of MIN.32
• It is the finest preference that satisfies the above three properties. That is, it is a
refinement of any preference that satisfies the above properties.
We claim that the three axioms are necessary for modeling a rational decision making
under type ambiguity: Monotonicity is a basic rationality axiom, and the other two capture
that the DM does not have any additional information distinguishing between the states
of the world besides the outcomes of his actions. Following Wald, one could define the
family of all refinements of MIN that satisfy the axioms, and analyze the equilibria when
all players follow models from this family. Showing that MINthenMAX is a refinement of
any of the preferences in this family, says that the set of equilibria when all players follow
models from this family, must include all equilibria for the case when the players follow the
MINthenMAX model (i.e., all MINthenMAX-NE). Moreover, MINthenMAX-NE are
the only profiles which are equilibria whenever all players follow models from this family. We
interpret this result as robustness of theMINthenMAX-NE notion: these are the equilibria
an outside party can expect (e.g., the self-enforcing contracts he can offer to the players),
while not knowing the exact preferences of the players.
Proof of Theorem 10.
In order to prove this theorem we first prove that any preference that satisfies the first
three properties can be defined using the worst (minimal) and best (maximal) outcomes of
the actions.33
31Notice that the MIN preference satisfies these properties.
32That is, for any two actions a and b, if a is strongly preferred to b by a DM holding a MIN preference,
then a is strongly preferred to b by a DM holding a MINthenMAX preference.
33Arrow and Hurwicz [3] showed a similar result for decision rules. They defined four properties (A–D)
and showed that under these properties the decision rule can be defined using the worst and best outcomes
only. Their properties are of a similar nature to the properties we present: Property A in [3] derives that
the decision rule is derived by a preference ([22, Prop. 1.D.2, p. 13]), and Properties B, C, and D are of a
similar flavor to the properties of state symmetry, independence of irrelevant information, and monotonicity
in the outcomes, respectively. In order to avoid defining the framework of decision rules, and because our
proof is simple and different from theirs, we prove Lemma 11 directly and do not rely on their result.
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Lemma 11.34
Any preference that satisfies monotonicity, state symmetry, and independence of irrel-
evant information can be defined as a function of the worst and the best outcomes of the
actions.
Using this lemma, we turn to prove the characterization of MINthenMAX.
It is easy to verify thatMINthenMAX indeed satisfies the first four properties. We note
that uniqueness is an immediate consequence of uniqueness of a finest refinement and prove
that indeed MINthenMAX is a finest refinement. Let P be an arbitrary refinement ofMIN
that satisfies Monotonicity, state symmetry, and Independence of Irrelevant Information. Let
a and b be two actions s.t. a DM holding a P preferences strongly prefers a to b, and we’ll
show that a is preferred to b also by a DM holding a MINthenMAX preference. Applying
Lemma 11, we get that P can be defined using the minimal and maximal outcomes. We
denote the respective minimal and maximal outcomes of a by ma and Ma, and of b by mb
and Mb.
Assume for contradiction that a DM holding aMINthenMAX preference weakly prefers
b to a. Since P is a refinement of MIN, it cannot be that mb > ma, and hence we get that
mb = ma and Mb > Ma. Both P and MINthenMAX can be defined as a function of the
minimal and maximal outcome, so with no loss of generality we can assume that a and b
result in the same minimal outcome ma is some state ωm, result in their respective maximal
outcomes in the same state ωM , and result in the same intermediate outcomes in all other
states. Since P is monotone, we get that a DM holding a P preference weakly prefers b to a
and by that get a contradiction.
As a corollary of Lemma 11, we get in addition an axiomatization of Wald’s MIN rule
as the unique rule that satisfies both the above three properties and the natural axioms of
Gilboa and Schmeidler [16]: certainty independence, continuity, monotonicity, and uncer-
tainty aversion.
Proposition 12.35
When there are at least three states of the world (|Ω| > 3), MIN is the unique preference
over ℜΩ (i.e., actions that return cardinal outcomes) that satisfies
• Let a and b be two actions, c ∈ ℜ, and α ∈ (0, 1). Then for the two actions a′ and b′
defined by a′ (ω) = α ·a (ω)+(1− α) ·c and b′ (ω) = α ·b (ω)+(1− α) ·c for all ω ∈ Ω.:
a ≻ b ⇐⇒ a′ ≻ b′.
• Let a, b, and c be three actions s.t. a ≻ b ≻ c. Then,
there exists a scalar α ∈ (0, 1) and an action fα defined by fα (ω) = α · a (ω) +
(1− α) · c (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω s.t. fα ≻ b,
and there exists a scalar β ∈ (0, 1) and an action fβ defined by fβ (ω) = β ·a (ω)+
(1− β) · c (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω s.t. fβ ≺ b.
34This lemma is proved in Appendix C
35This lemma is proved in Appendix D
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• For any two actions a and b s.t. a ∼ b (i.e., a < b and b < a), it holds that cα < a
for any action cα defined by cα (ω) = α · a (ω) + (1− α) · b (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, for some
α ∈ [0, 1].
• Monotonicity.
• State symmetry.
• Independence of irrelevant information.
4 Bilateral trade
In order to demonstrate this new notion of equilibrium, MINthenMAX-NE, we apply
it to two economic scenarios that have type ambiguity. For both of them we show a
MINthenMAX-NE in pure strategies always exists and analyze these equilibria.
The first scenario we analyze is bilateral trade games. Bilateral trade is one of the most
basic economic models, which captures many common scenarios. It describes an interaction
between two players, a seller and a buyer. The seller has in his possession a single indivisible
item that he values at vs (e.g., the cost of producing the item), and the buyer values the
item at vb. We assume that both values are private information, i.e., each player knows
only his own value, and we would like to study the cases in which the item changes hands
in return for money, i.e., a transaction occurs.36 Chatterjee and Samuelson [10] presented
bilateral trade as a model for negotiations between two strategic agents, such as settlement of
a claim out of court, union-management negotiations, and of course a model for negotiation
on transaction between two individuals and a model for trade in financial products. The
important feature the authors note is that an agent, while certain of the potential value
he places on a transaction, has only partial information concerning its value for the other
player.37 Bilateral trade is also of a theoretical importance, and moreover a multi-player
generalization of it, double auction.,38 These models have been used as a tool to get insights
into how to organize trade between buyers and sellers, as well as to study how prices in
markets are determined.
In this section we assume that there is ambiguity about the players’ values (their types),
and we study trading mechanisms, i.e., procedures for deciding whether the item changes
hands, and how much the buyer pays for it. We assume that the players are strategic, and
hence a mechanism should be analyzed according to its expected outcomes in equilibrium.
We concentrate on a family of simple mechanisms (a generalization of the bargaining
rules of Chatterjee and Samuelson [10]): the seller and the buyer post simultaneously their
respective bids, as and ab, and if as 6 ab the item is sold for x (as, ab), for x being a known
monotone function satisfying x (as, ab) ∈ [as, ab]. For ease of presentation, we add to the
36Another branch of the literature on bilateral trade studies the process of bargaining (getting to a suc-
cessful transaction). Since we would like to study the impact of ambiguity, we restrict our attention to the
outcome.
37For instance, in haggling over the price of a used car, neither buyer nor seller knows the other’s walk-away
price.
38In a double auction [14], there are several sellers and buyers, and we study mechanisms and interactions
matching them to trading pairs.
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action sets of both players a “no participation” action ⊥, which models the option of a
player not to participate in the mechanism; i.e., there is no transaction whenever one of
the players plays ⊥. This simplifies the presentation by grouping together profiles in which
a player chooses extreme bids that would not be matched by the other player. Hence, the
utilities of a seller of type vs and a buyer of type vb from an action profile (as, ab) are (w.l.o.g.,
we normalize the utilities of both players to zero in the case where there is no transaction):
us (vs; as, ab) =

as 6 ab x (as, ab)− vs
as > ab 0
as = ⊥ ∨ at = ⊥ 0
ub (vb; as, ab) =

as 6 ab vb − x (as, ab)
as > ab 0
as = ⊥ ∨ at = ⊥ 0.
Under full information (i.e., the values vs and vb are commonly known), there is essentially
only one kind of equilibrium: the one-price equilibrium. If vs 6 vb, the equilibria in which
there is a transaction are all the profiles (as, ab) s.t. as = ab ∈ [vs, vb] (i.e., the players agree
on a price), and the equilibria in which there is no transaction are all profiles in which both
players choose not to participate, regardless of their type.
Introducing type ambiguity, we define the seller type set Vs and the buyer type set Vb,
where each set holds the possible valuations of the player for the item. We show that under
type ambiguity, there are at most three kinds of equilibria, and we fully characterize the
equilibria set. We show that in addition to the above no-transaction equilibria and one-
price equilibria, we get a new kind of equilibrium: the two-price equilibrium. In such an
equilibrium, both the seller and the buyer participate regardless of their valuations, and bid
one of two possible prices: pL and pH . For some type sets, namely Vs and Vb, these two
prices are the only full-participation equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which both players choose
to announce a price and participate, regardless of their value.
Lemma 13.39
Let G be a bilateral trade game defined by a price function x (as, ab) and two type sets Vs
and Vt, both having a minimum and maximum.
40 Then all the MINthenMAX-NE of G
are of one of the following classes:
1. No-transaction equilibria (These equilibria exist for any two sets Vs and Vb)
In these equilibria, neither the buyer nor the seller participates (i.e., they play ⊥, or
bid a too extreme bid for all types of the other player), regardless of their valuations.
2. One-price equilibria (These equilibria are defined only when min Vs 6 maxVb, i.e.,
when an ex-post transaction is possible.)
39This result is also valid, and even more natural, for infinite type sets.
40We state the result here for the case where both sets have a minimal valuation and have a maximal
valuation. Dropping this assumption does not change the result in any essential way: some of the inequalities
are changed to strict inequalities.
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In a one-price equilibrium, both the seller and the buyer choose to participate for some
of their types. It is defined by a price p ∈ [minVs,maxVb] s.t. the equilibrium strategies
are:
The seller bids p for valuations vs 6 p, and ⊥ otherwise (the second clause might
be vacuously true).
The buyer bids p for valuations vb > p, and ⊥ otherwise (the second clause might
be vacuously true).
Hence, the outcome is
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Buyer
Seller
Low: vs 6 p High: vs > p
Low: vb < p no transaction no transaction
High: vb > p p no transaction
.
3. Two-price equilibria (These equilibria are defined only when minVs 6 minVb and
maxVs 6 maxVb, i.e., when there is a value for the seller s.t. an ex-post transaction
is possible for any value of the buyer, and vice versa.)
In a two-price equilibrium, all types of both the seller and the buyer choose to partici-
pate, and their bids depend on their valuations. It is defined by two prices pL < pH s.t.{
minVs 6 pL < maxVs 6 pH
pL 6 minVb < pH 6 maxVb
and the equilibrium strategies are:
The seller bids pL for valuations vs 6 pL, and pH otherwise.
The buyer bids pH for valuations vb > pH , and pL otherwise.
Hence, the outcome is
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Buyer
Seller
Low: vs 6 pL High: vs > pL
Low: vb < pH pL no transaction
High: vb > pH x (pL, pH) ∈ (pL, pH) pH
.
Proof sketch. (The full details of the proof can be found in Appendix E)
It is easy to verify that these profiles are indeed equilibria. We will prove that they are
the only equilibria.
Assume for contradiction there is another MINthenMAX-NE profile of actions (i.e.,
bids or ⊥), namely, (as, ab). We define Ps to be the set of bids that are bid by the seller, i.e.,
Ps = {as (vs) | as (vs) 6= ⊥}, and similarly we define Pb = {ab (vb) | as (vb) 6= ⊥}. Both these
sets are not empty since (as, ab) is not a no-transaction equilibrium. First, we notice that
if Ps is of size one, i.e., whenever the seller participates he announces p; then, if the buyer
chooses to participate (based on his valuation), he chooses to match p in order to minimize
the price (and vice versa). Analyzing the valuations for which they choose to participate
proves that this profile is a one-price equilibrium. Now, assume that both these sets are of
size at least two. If both players participate regardless of their value (never choose ⊥), then
the worst and best cases for a player are those of facing the highest and lowest bids of the
other player. Hence his best response will be to match one of the two, and we get a two-price
equilibrium. If the seller chooses whether to participate based on his value, i.e., there is a
value vs for which he chooses ⊥, then the buyer cannot guarantee himself more than zero
(for instance, if he meets vs). Hence, he will choose one of the actions that guarantee him
zero in the worst case (e.g., ⊥), and choose among these actions according to their best
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case (meeting the lowest-bidding type of the seller). Hence, given his value, the buyer either
chooses ⊥, or matches the lowest bidding type of the seller. This proves this equilibrium is
either a no-transaction equilibrium or a one-price equilibrium. The case in which the buyer
chooses whether to participate based on his value is symmetrical.
We find it interesting that the set of equilibria depends on the possible types of the players,
and not on the price mechanism x (as, ab). In addition to the two classic equilibrium kinds,
no-transaction equilibrium and one-price equilibrium, we get a new kind of equilibrium.
We see that in this equilibrium each of the players announces one of two bids, which is
tantamount to announcing whether his value is above some threshold or not. This decision
captures the (non-probabilistic) trade-off a player is facing: whether to trade for sure, i.e.,
with all types of the other player, or to get a better price. For example., the buyer decides
whether to bid the high price and buy the item for sure, taking the risk of paying more than
his value; or whether to bid the low price and buy at a lower price, taking the risk of not
buying at all. Since MINthenMAX is a function of the worst-case and best-case outcomes
only, it does not seem surprising that we get this dichotomous trade-off and at most two
bids (messages) for each player in equilibrium.
This result might explain the emergence of market scenarios in which a participant needs
to choose which one of two markets to attend, e.g., florists who choose whether to sell in a
highly competitive auction or in an outside market, and he needs to choose between the two
while not knowing the demand for that day. In a continuation work, we follow this story,
and analyze double auctions with several buyers and sellers.
5 Coordination games
In this section we study a second application of MINthenMAX-NE to an economic sce-
nario: analyzing coordination games with type ambiguity. These games model scenarios in
which the participants prefer to coordinate their actions with others, e.g., due to positive
externalities.Some examples are choosing a meeting place (a generalization the Battle of the
Sexes game [21, Ch. 5, Sec. 3]), choosing a cellular company, and placing a public good or bad
when the cost is shared. We analyze coordination games in which all players prefer to max-
imize the number of other players they coordinate with (while being indifferent about their
identity), but they might differ in their tie-breaking rule between two maximizing actions.
Definition 14 (Coordination games with type ambiguity).41
A (finite) coordination game of n players over m locations is a game in which all players
have the same set of actions of size m (and we refer to the actions as locations), and the
preference of each player (his type) over the action profiles is defined by a strict (ordinal)
preference α over the locations in the following way: Player i, holding a preference α over
41Most of the current literature (e.g., [28, pp. 54–74], [21, pp. 90–91], [24, pp. 15–16]) deal with two-player
coordination games (games in which the best response of a player is to copy the other player’s action). We
use the same name here for multi-player (generalized) coordination games, which capture the same kind of
scenarios.
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the locations, strongly prefers an action profile a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A to an action profile b =
(b1, . . . , bn) ∈ A if either he meets more players under a than under b (|{j 6= i | aj = ai}| >
|{j 6= i | bj = bi}|) or if he meets the same (non-zero) number of players under both profiles
and he prefers the meeting location in a to the one in b (ai is preferred to bi according to α).
That is, the set of types of player i, T i, is a set of strict preferences over the m locations.
In particular, a player is indifferent between the outcomes in which he does not meet any of
the other players.
First, we note that the conceptMIN-NE is a too coarse for analyzing coordination games;
almost all pure action profiles of a (large enough) coordination game are MIN-NE.
Lemma 15.
Let G be a coordination game over m locations with n players, each of them having at
least t types. Then more than (1− 1/mt−1)n-fraction of the pure action profiles are MIN-NE
of the game.
Specifically, a profile is a MIN-NE of G iff either there exists a location l s.t. all types
of every player choose l in the profile, or there does not exist a location l and a player i s.t.
all the types of player i choose l in the profile.
We analyze the refinement of MIN-NE, pure MINthenMAX-NE,42 which we show
always exists. We show that every MINthenMAX-NE profile a is uniquely defined by the
set of locations chosen in a,
L (a) =
{
l
∣∣ ∃i ∈ N , ti ∈ T i s.t. player i of type ti plays l in the profile a} .
Lemma 16.43
Let G be a coordination game and let L be a non-empty set of locations. There exists a
MINthenMAX-NE profile a s.t. L (a) = L if and only if for all i the mapping f i : T i → L
that maps a type to his best location in L is onto.
Moreover, the action profile a in which every type of every player chooses his best location
in L is the unique pure MINthenMAX-NE that satisfies L (a) = L.
Abusing notation, we say that a location set L is a MINthenMAX-NE (and shortly
L ∈MINthenMAX-NE (G)) if there exists a MINthenMAX-NE profile a s.t. L (a) = L.
Two immediate corollary from the lemma are that there is always a pure MINthenMAX
equilibrium and that any location set L ∈MINthenMAX-NE satisfies |L| 6 mini |T i|, and,
in particular, if there is no ambiguity about the type of at least one player (∃i s.t. |T i| = 1),
then the onlyMINthenMAX-NE are those in which all types of all players choose the same
location. Notice that for any vector of type sets {T i} an action profile in which all types of
all players choose the same location, which does not depend of the players’ preferences, is
always a MINthenMAX-NE. In these profiles, any deviation of a (type of a) player results
42Since any MINthenMAX-NE is also a MIN-NE this can be interpreted as an equilibrium selection
process.
43This lemma is proved in Appendix F
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in the deviator not meeting any of the other players and hence it is not beneficial for the
deviator.
From now on we assume that |T i| > 1 for all i (there is a real ambiguity about the
preference of each of the players), and study the equilibria (location sets) according to
MINthenMAX. We analyze the non-trivial equilibria that emerge due to type ambiguity.
We call a profile p a non-trivial profile if |L (p)| > 1,44 and call a location set a non-trivial
location set if it includes at least two locations.
From the characterization above, we prove several easy properties ofMINthenMAX-NE.
Corollary 17.
Let G be a coordination game over m locations and n players with type sets T i.
• Let a be an equilibrium profile; then the set{
l
∣∣ ∃ti ∈ T i s.t. player i of type ti plays l in the profile a}
is independent of i (i.e., in equilibrium all players choose the same set of actions).
• ( Increasing ambiguity) Let G′ be a coordination game over m locations and n players
with type sets T̂ i satisfying T i ⊆ T̂ i for all i. Then, MINthenMAX-NE (G) ⊆
MINthenMAX-NE (G′).45
• (MINthenMAX-NE is downward closed) If L ∈MINthenMAX-NE (G), then any
L′ ⊆ L is also an equilibrium of G.
• ( Irrelevant information)
– Let L be an equilibrium of G and let T̂ i be the result of changing the preferences of
the types of player i, while keeping the preferences over the locations in L. Then
L is also an equilibrium of the coordination game over m locations and n players
with type sets
〈
T −i, T̂ i
〉
.46
– Let L be an equilibrium of G and let G′ be an extension of G to m + 1 locations
s.t. for any player and any of his types the preference over the first m locations
is the same as in G. Then L is also an equilibrium of G′.
5.1 Coordination games with single-peaked consistent preferences
Next, we study the equilibria of coordination games under type ambiguity for several special
cases in which the type sets satisfy some natural constraints. In this work, we present cases
in which for every player the set of preferences T i is single-peaked consistent with regard to
a line.
Definition 18 (single-peaked consistent preferences with regard to a line [7]).
A preference α over a set of locations S ⊆ ℜ is said to be single-peaked with regard to ℜ,
if there exists a utility function f : ℜ → ℜ s.t. for any two locations y and z, y is preferred
to z if f (y) > f (z) (i.e., f represents α); the top-ranked location x⋆ in α is the unique
44I.e., there exist at least two different locations, each of which is chosen by some type of some player.
45In particular, the equilibria of the case with no ambiguity are also equilibria of any coordination game.
46That is, the same type sets for all players except player i, and the perturbed type set for player i.
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maximizer of f ; and for any two locations y and z, if x⋆ < y < z or x⋆ > y > z, then y is
preferred to z.
A set of preferences over a set of locations S is single-peaked consistent w.r.t. a line,
if there exists an embedding function e : S → ℜ (which we refer to as the order of the
locations) s.t. for any preference α in the set, e (α) is single-peaked with regard to ℜ.
For ease of presentation, we state the results for the case S ⊆ ℜ (and so the embedding is
the identity function). For example, consider the scenario of deciding on locating a common
good on a linear street. It is known that each player holds an ideal location (his location),
and that his preference is monotone in the path between this ideal location and the common
good. Yet, there might be ambiguity about the ideal location, or about the preference
between locations that are not on the same side of the ideal location (e.g, the preference
might be a function of properties of the path).
We interpret the single-peakedness assumption as constraining the type ambiguity in a
natural way: Player i knows the order over the locations common to all types of player j,
and hence he has some information he can use to anticipate the actions of other players.
Note that a set of single-peaked consistent preferences might be single-peaked with regard
to more than one order of the locations (i.e., an embedding).47 In cases where T i is single-
peaked consistent w.r.t. several orders of the locations (which can be thought of as a stronger
constraint), our results hold w.r.t. any of the orders, giving rise to stricter characterizations.
In the two examples to follow, we limit the ambiguity further (i.e., adding more information
on players) in two ways.
The first case we analyze is when assuming no ambiguity about the players’ ideal loca-
tions. That is, for every player there exists a location x⋆ (his ideal location) that is shared
by all his types in T i. We show that in this case there can be at most two locations in the
equilibrium set, one situated to the right of all ideal locations and one situated to the left of
all of them (“right” and “left” w.r.t. the order of each player).
Lemma 20.
Let G be a coordination game with single-peaked consistent type sets T i s.t. there is no
ambiguity about the players’ ideal locations, and let xi be player i’s ideal location. Then any
(non-trivial) MINthenMAX-NE L satisfies that there exist two different locations α and β
s.t. L = {α, β} and for every player i and order <i s.t. T i is single-peaked consistent w.r.t
<i it holds that α <i xi <i β.
This condition is tight. Any set L satisfying the above condition is a MINthenMAX-NE
of the game in case the type sets T i are rich enough.48
47
Example 19. The preferences 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 ≻ 5, 2 ≻ 1 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 ≻ 5, 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 4 ≻ 5, and
3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1 ≻ 4 ≻ 5 are single-peaked w.r.t. the following four orders (and their inverse): 1−2−3−4−5,
5−1−2−3−4, 5−1−2−3−4, and 5−4−1−2−3.
Escoffier et al. [13] proved that for any number of locations n and r 6 2n−1, there exist 1
r
2n−1 different
preferences that are single-peaked consistent w.r.t. r different orders (for the tight bounds see [13]).
48In particular, if for all players the type set T i contains all single-peaked preferences with ideal location
xi w.r.t. to some order (and only them), then the above characterizes all (non-trivial) MINthenMAX-NE.
21
In particular, in case ∪iT
i is single-peaked consistent w.r.t. an order <, any (non-
trivial) MINthenMAX-NE L satisfies that there exist two different locations α and β s.t.
L = {α, β} and α < mini xi 6 maxi xi < β.
Proof.
Notice that the result is equivalent to requiring that for every player i there be at most
one location α in L s.t. α <i xi and at most one location β in L s.t. xi <i β. Assume for
contradiction that either there are two locations in L to the left of xi or two locations to the
right of xi. Then one of them must be on the path between xi and the other location, and
hence preferred to the other location regardless of the type of player i, in contradiction to L
being an equilibrium.
In order to prove tightness, given a set L = {α, β} as above, for any player i there are
single-peaked preferences with xi at the top in which α is preferred to β, and there are single-
peaked preferences with xi at the top in which β is preferred to α. If the set T i includes both
a type that prefers α to β and a type that prefers β to α, then the mapping f i : T i → L of
a type to his preferred location in L is onto. Hence, if this condition is satisfied by all type
sets, then L is a MINthenMAX-NE.
We see that under this homogeneity constraint, the (non-trivial) equilibria are constrained
to be two extreme locations. This result can also be interpreted as the power of extreme
players in scenarios where there is a common agreement on the order. Note that when
the types are single-peaked w.r.t. several orders, the equilibria should satisfy the above
characterization w.r.t. all of them. For instance, consider the scenario of two players and type
sets T 1 = T 2 = {2 ≻ 1 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 ≻ 5 , 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 4 ≻ 5} (a subset of the set of preferences
in Example 19). These preferences are single-peaked w.r.t. the order 5−1−2−3−4, but L = {4, 5}
is not a MINthenMAX-NE, albeit satisfying the property of the lemma because both types
prefer 4 to 5 and will not choose 5, and indeed {4, 5} does not satisfy the property w.r.t. the
order 1−2−3−4−5.
The second case we analyze is having ambiguity about the ideal location only, while
assuming a structure on the preferences (in a sense, this case is the complement of the first
case). A simple example of such a structure is that of Euclidean preferences. A Euclidean
preference is uniquely derived from its ideal location by ordering the locations according to
their distance from the ideal location. Notice that this restriction too can be stated as a
homogeneity constraint on the preferences given a common embedding: it can be stated as
a common metric on the location set that is shared by all preferences.
Lemma 21.
Let G be a coordination game on the real line s.t. all players have Euclidean preferences.
Then a (non-trivial) location set L = {l1 < l2 < · · · < lk} is a MINthenMAX-NE if and
only if for every player i there are types derived by possible ideal locations for him x1 < x2 <
· · · < xk s.t. for t = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1
xt <
lt + lt+1
2
< xt+1,
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i.e., the median between lt and lt+1 is between xt and xt+1.
49
A special case of the lemma is where there are exactly two types of each player that are
derived from two possible ideal locations xi < yi. In this scenario we get that a (non-trivial)
location set L is a MINthenMAX-NE if and only if there exist two locations α and β s.t.
L = {α, β} and m = 1
2
(α + β) is (strictly) between xi and yi for all players. Hence, a (non-
trivial) MINthenMAX-NE exists if and only if the intersection of the segments (xi, yi) is
non-empty.
Proof.
⇒: Let L = {l1 < l2 < · · · < lk} be an equilibrium and let i be a player. Since L is an
equilibrium, there are types of player i,50 x1 < x2 < · · · < xk, s.t. player i chooses lt when
his type is xt. In particular, for t < k his preference between lt and lt+1 when his type is
xt is different from his preference when his type is xt+1. Hence, xt and xt+1 lie on different
sides of the median between lt and lt+1.
⇐: Following the same reasoning, it is easy to see that if L satisfies the property of the
lemma, then player i of type xt prefers lt to any other location in L, and hence L is an
equilibrium.
6 Summary and future directions
How people choose an action to take when possessing only partial information, and how
they should choose their action, are basic questions in economics, and on them the defi-
nition of equilibrium is built (both as a prediction tool and as a self-enforcing contract).
The main stream of game-theoretic literature assumes that economic agents are expectation
maximizers (according to some objective or subjective prior) and, moreover, that there is
some consistency between the players’ priors (commonly, the common prior assumption).
In this work, we chose the inverse scenario and studied cases in which the players have
no information on the state of the world. We defined a general framework of games with
ambiguity following Harsanyi’s model of games with incomplete information [17], and in
particular, games with type ambiguity. We axiomatized a family of decision models under
ambiguity that we claim a rational agent is expected to follow, and characterized the finest
refinement of this family, MINthenMAX. This family can be interpreted as all rational
models of decision in cases of (extreme) ambiguity that follow Wald’s MiniMax principle,
defined by the different ways to decide in cases in which the MiniMax principle is mute.
In many scenarios with type ambiguity Wald’s MiniMax principle is too coarse, and so the
corresponding equilibrium (MIN-NE) has almost no predictive power. The way to justify
a selection process from these equilibria is to refine the players’ preference, that is, assume
they act according to a decision model in this family. We showed MINthenMAX is the
49In the proof we do not use the fact that all type sets T i are Euclidean w.r.t. the same embedding, and
actually the condition in the lemma can be weakened to hold only with respect to each of the embeddings
of T i.
50We identify the types with their ideal locations.
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unique model that follows Wald’s MiniMax principle and breaks all possible instances of
indifference (without violating the rationality axioms we assumed). Finally, we studied the
respective equilibrium notion, MINthenMAX-NE, and applied it to two families of games:
coordination games and bilateral trade games.
One might ask himself why to choose MINthenMAX as the analysis tool, and not a
different decision model in the family. First, we note that, just like the MIN model, the
MINthenMAX model has a simple and intelligible cognitive interpretation, and so it does
not require a complex epistemological assumption on the players, which other models might
impose. In addition, we note thatMINthenMAX-NE (G), i.e., the equilibria of G under the
MINthenMAX, are in fact also equilibria of G under any profile of rational refinements of
Wald’s MiniMax principle. Moreover, MINthenMAX-NE (G) can be equivalently defined
as the set of all such robust equilibria of G. For instance, these are the profiles an outside
actor can suggest as a self-enforcing contract, even if he does not know the exact preferences
of the players.
This scenario of extreme ambiguity might seem unrealistic. Yet, we claim this model
approximates many partial-information real-life scenarios better than the subjective expec-
tation maximization model. Clearly, if players have information which they can use to
construct a belief about the other players, and we expect they will use it, then the expecta-
tion maximization decision model is a better analysis tool. In intermediate scenarios, when
players have some information but it is unreasonable to expect them to form a distribution
over the world, it is reasonable to model the players as following one of the intermediate
models for decision making under ambiguity,51 e.g., the multi-prior model (for an overview
of such models, the interested reader is referred to [15]). It remains an open question what
are the common features of equilibria under MINthenMAX and equilibria under other de-
cision models under ambiguity. By characterizing these common features, we would like to
analyze the sensitivity of the equilibria we’ve found in this work to the specific analysis tool.
One could also justify the model we presented, via justifying the axioms, for other scenar-
ios. E.g., for scenarios in which the players might have some information on the preferences
of others, but due to extreme risk aversion or bounded rationality constraints, they follow
Wald’s MiniMax model. Moreover, in cases in which one justified the axioms we presented
(and mostly the invariance to irrelevant information axiom), e.g., on cognitive grounds, we
get that the MINthenMAX-NE is the right analysis tool for the same reasons we presented
above.
In order to study further the notion of equilibrium under MINthenMAX-NE, we hope
to analyze other families of games, e.g., finer cases of coordination games when adding ho-
mogeneity constraints that are either knowledge on other players, or intra-player agreement.
In addition, we see few further directions of research.
Variance of information between types: In the examples we analyzed the information of
a player did not depend on his type (in other words, a player cannot deduce from his type
any information on the feasible types of others). The model we presented in Sec. 2 includes
51We refer to them as intermediate since they do not satisfy the principle of indifference, and hence they
differentiate between the states of the world.
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more general scenarios. We have preliminary results, which we omitted here, for Schelling’s
Homeowner-Burglar game [28, p. 207]. For this game, we got similar predictions to the
prediction of Schelling, replicating the power of partial-knowledge of high degrees.
Mechanism design: In a continuation work, we extend the result regarding bilateral trade,
to characterization of incentive compatible, individually rational, deterministic mechanisms
for bilateral trade. We show that (essentially) the implementable allocation rules, are those
that are implemented using the price announcement mechanisms we analyzed. Also here,
implementability under MINthenMAX-NE can be interpreted as robust implementability
under ambiguity, i.e., implementability without assuming a specific decision model, but
analyzing the profiles that are equilibria for any profile of decision models of the players
from the family we characterized. Another direction of research is analyzing what a designer
can gain by adding ambiguity to a mechanism, and specifically whether it is possible to
increase the participation of the players, similarly to the full-participation result we proved.
Information update: The main drawback of modeling the knowledge of a player using
a set of types for other players (or, in the general case, of states of the world) instead of
a richer structure, is that there is no reasonable way to define information update in this
model. This prevents us to extend this work to two natural directions: analysis of extensive
form games (e.g., when the players play in turns, learning the type of each other as the
evolve), and value of information (the question of how much a player should invest in order
to decrease his ambiguity). In the decision theory literature, there are several non-Bayesian
information update rules, e.g., Dempster-Shafer [12, 29] and Jeffrey update rule [19]. These
rules usually assume a finer representation of knowledge than the representation we had
in this work, but we think that after basing a rational decision model in our simplified
knowledge representation, it should not be hard to extend the decision model to these finer
knowledge models.
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A Proof of Lemma 3 (Best response is well defined)
This lemma can be easily extended to infinite number of states case by assuming some
structure on the actions set and the utility function.
Lemma.
The following best response correspondences are non-empty: pureMIN-BR, mixedMIN-BR,
pure MINthenMAX-BR, and mixed MINthenMAX-BR.
Proof.
We prove the lemma in the more general decision theory framework. We show that if
there are finitely many states of the world and finitely many pure actions, there is always
at least one optimal mixed action. Since the number of players and the number of types of
each player are finite, a player faces one of a finite number of profiles (states of the world)
and we get the desired result.
The existence of an optimal pure action is trivial since there are finitely many pure
actions. Next, we prove the existence of optimal mixed actions. The set of optimal actions
according to MIN OptAct
MIN
is
OptAct
MIN
= argmax
σ∈∆(A)
minω∈Ω u (σ, ω) .
For every state of the world ω ∈ Ω, u (σ, ω) is a continuous function in σ (it is a linear
transformation). minω∈Ω u (σ, ω) is also continuous in σ as the minimum for finitely many
continuous functions. Hence, argmaxa∈σ∈∆(A)minω∈Ω u (σ, ω) is non-empty as the maxima
of a continuous function over a simplex. Moreover, OptAct
MIN
is a compact set.
Similarly, the set of optimal actions according to MINthenMAX
OptActMINthenMAX = argmax
a∈OptActMIN
maxω∈Ω u (σ, ω)
is non-empty since OptAct
MIN
is compact and maxω∈Ω u (σ, ω) is continuous in σ.
B Proof of Theorem 4 (MIN-NE existence)
Theorem.
Every game with ambiguity has a MIN-NE in mixed actions.
Proof.
We prove the existence of a mixed MIN-NE by applying Kakutani’s fixed point theo-
rem [20]52 to the following set S and set-valued function F . We set S ⊆ ℜK to be the set
of all profiles of mixed strategies of the types,53 i.e., a cross product of the corresponding
52Let S ⊆ ℜn be a non-empty compact convex set. Let F : S → S be a set-valued upper semi-continuous
function on S such that F (s) is non-empty and convex for all s ∈ S. Then F has a fixed point, i.e., a point
s ∈ S such that s ∈ F (s).
53for K being the sum of the number of types over the players.
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simplexes. Given a strategy profile s, we define F (s) to be the product of the best response
correspondences of the different types to the profile s.
Clearly, S is a convex compact non-empty set. We proved (Lemma 3) that the best
response always exists and hence F (s) is non-empty for all s ∈ S. We show that the best
response correspondence of a type is an upper semi-continuous function (and hence also F )
by applying Berge’s Maximum theorem [6, Thm. 2, p. 116]54 to (where t−i (ω) are the types
player i is facing according to ω, and s−i (t−i (ω)) are their actions according to s)
f(σi, s)=min
ω∈Ω
u
(
ω, σi, s−i
(
t−i (ω)
))
.
We notice that the best response of a type of player i to a strategy profile s ∈ S is the
maxima over his mixed strategies σi of f(σi, s); that u is a linear function in σi and in s; and
that f (σi, s) is a continuous function in s and σi. Hence, we get that the best response is
an upper semi-continuous correspondence.
Next, we show that for any profile s and a type of player i, the best response set is convex,
and hence also F (s) is a convex set. In order to prove the convexity of the best response
set, let σ and τ be two best responses and let
m = min
ω∈Ω
u
(
ω, σi, s−i
(
t−i (ω)
))
be their worst-case value. For any convex combination ζ of σ and τ , on one hand we get
that
min
ω∈Ω
u
(
ω, ζ i, s−i
(
t−i (ω)
))
6 m
from the optimality of σ, and on the other hand
u
(
ω, ζ i, s−i
(
t−i (ω)
))
> m for all ω ∈ Ω.
since we assumed this lower-bound both on σ and on τ . Hence,
min
ω∈Ω
u
(
ω, ζ i, s−i
(
t−i (ω)
))
= m
and ζ is a best response.
By applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem we get that there is a profile p s.t. p ∈ F (p).
That is, in the profile p every type best-responds to the others, so p is a MIN-NE.
C Proof of Lemma 11 (Axiomatization)
Lemma.
Any preference that satisfies monotonicity, state symmetry, and independence of irrel-
evant information can be defined as a function of the worst and the best outcomes of the
actions.
54If f : X × Y → ℜ is a continuous function, then the mapping µ : X → Y defined by µ (x) =
argmaxy∈Y f (y) is a upper semi-continuous mapping.
(The statement of the theorem is taken from [1, Lemma 17.31, p. 570])
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Proof.
For this proof it is easier to use the following property that is equivalent (when Ω is
finite) to state symmetry.
Axiom.
For any action a and bijection ψ : Ω→ Ω, the DM is indifferent between a and a ◦ ψ.
Let a and a′ be two actions over the states set Ω s.t. minω∈Ω a (ω) = minω∈Ω b (ω) and
maxω∈Ω a (ω) = maxω∈Ω b (ω). We show that the DM is indifferent between the two, and
notice that this will prove the lemma. Assuming this claim, given any two pairs of actions:
a and a′ that have the same minimal and maximal outcome, and b and b′ that have the same
minimal and maximal outcome, a is preferred to b if and only if a′ is preferred to b′, because
the DM is indifferent between a and a′, and between b and b′.
Assume for contradiction that (w.l.o.g) the DM strictly prefers a′ to a. Since the pref-
erence satisfies state symmetry, we can assume that a and a′ are co-monotone, that is, for
any two states ω and ω′, the actions satisfy that (a (ω)− a (ω′)) (a′ (ω)− a′ (ω′)) > 0. We
denote by m and M the minimal and maximal outcomes of a and by ωm and ωM the two
respective states of world.
ωm other states ωM
a m ∈ [m,M ] M
a′ m ∈ [m,M ] M
We define two new actions over Ω. An action b that results in m in all states besides
ωM and M otherwise, and an action b
′ that results in M in all states besides ωm and m
otherwise. ωm other states ωM
a m ∈ [m,M ] M
b m m M
a′ m ∈ [m,M ] M
b′ m M M .
Due to monotonicity the DM (weakly) prefers a to b, and b′ to a′, and hence the DM
strictly prefers b′ to b. Next, we define an auxiliary space Ω̂ = {ωm, ωo, ωM} and two actions
on it c and c′ by unifying the middle states into one as follows:
ωm ωo ωM
c m m M
c′ m M M .
Since the preference satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Information we get that the DM
strictly prefers c′ to c. Now we define a new action c′′ (see below), and by the state symmetry
property we get that also c′′ is strictly preferred to c.
ωm ωo ωM
c m m M
c′ m M M
c′′ M M m .
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Using a collapsing argument similar to the one above, we get that for the following
collapsed space and two actions
ωm ωM
d m M
d′′ M m ,
d′′ is strictly preferred to d, but this contradicts the state symmetry property.
D Proof of Proposition 12 (Axiomatization of MIN)
Proposition.
Let X be a set of outcomes and let Y be the set of distributions over X with finite supports,
and we identify X with the Dirac distributions {y ∈ Y | y (x) = 1 for some x ∈ X}.
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world s.t. |Ω| > 3 and let L = Y Ω (i.e., actions
which in each state of the world return a lottery over X). For f, g ∈ L and α ∈ [0, 1], we
define αf + (1− α) g as the state-wise compound lottery, that is, the action that returns for
each state ω ∈ Ω the lottery αf (ω) + (1− α) g (ω) ∈ Y .
We will denote by Lc ⊂ L the constant functions in L, and by Lo = XΩ ⊂ L the functions
that return pure outcomes.
Let < be a preference order over L that satisfies Gilboa-Schmeidler Axioms A.2-A.5 [16]
• A.2: Certainty independence: For all f, g in L and h in Lc and for all α ∈ (0, 1):
f ≻ g ⇐⇒ αg + (1− α)h ≻ αf + (1− α)h.
• A.3: Continuity: For all f , g and h in L: if f ≻ g and g ≻ h then there are α and β
in (0, 1) such that αf + (1− α) h ≻ g and g ≻ βf + (1− β)h.
• A.4: Monotonicity: For all f and g in L: if f (ω) < g (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω then f < g.
• A.5: Uncertainty aversion: For all f, g ∈ L and α ∈ (0, 1): f < g and g < f implies
αf + (1− α) g < f .
and satisfies state symmetry and independence of irrelevant information on Lo.
Then < is represented by a function u : X → ℜ such that for any f, g ∈ Y
f < g ⇐⇒ min
ω∈Ω
E
x∼f(ω)
[u (x)] > min
ω∈Ω
E
x∼g(ω)
[u (x)] .
Proof.
Let < be a preference order which satisfies the above. Gilboa and Schmeidler [16] proved
that < is represented by a function u : X → ℜ and a non-empty, closed and convex set C of
probability measures on Ω such that for any f, g ∈ L
f < g ⇐⇒ min
P∈C
E
ω∼P
[
E
x∼f(ω)
[u (x)]
]
> min
P∈C
E
ω∼P
[
E
x∼g(ω)
[u (x)]
]
and in particular for any a, b ∈ Lo
a < b ⇐⇒ min
P∈C
E
ω∼P
[u (a (ω))] > min
P∈C
E
ω∼P
[u (b (ω))] .
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Let l and h be two outcomes s.t. the DM strictly prefers the action that gives him h
in all states of the world over the action that gives him l in all states of the world, and so
u (h) > u (l). We denote u (h) and u (l) by uh and ul, respectively.
For every ω ∈ Ω, we define ǫω = minP∈C P (ω), and we define the actions lω and hω by
lω (ω
′) =
{
l ω = ω′
h otherwise
and hω (ω
′) =
{
h ω = ω′
l otherwise
. From Lemma 11 we get that the
preference on L0 can be defined as a function of the worst and the best outcomes of the
actions, and so the DM is indifferent between lω⋆ and hω† for every ω
⋆, ω† ∈ Ω. Hence,
ul + (hh − ul)
∑
ω 6=ω⋆
ǫω 6 min
P∈C
E
ω∼P
[u (lω⋆ (ω))] = min
P∈C
E
ω∼P
[u (hω† (ω))] = ul + (uh − ul) ǫω† ,
and
∑
ω 6=ω⋆ ǫω 6 ǫω† . Hence, since |Ω| > 2 we get that ǫω = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Next we prove that for any action a ∈ Lo it holds that
min
P∈C
E
ω∼P
[u (a (ω))] = min
ω∈Ω
u (a (ω)) .
The DM is indifferent between a and the action a′ that gives him argmaxω∈Ω u (a (ω)) on
one state ω⋆ and argminω∈Ω u (a (ω)) on all other states. Hence,
minP∈C Eω∼P [u (a (ω))] = minP∈C Eω∼P [u (a
′ (ω))]
= minω∈Ω u (a (ω)) + (maxω∈Ω u (a (ω))−minω∈Ω u (a (ω))) ·minP∈C P (ω⋆)
= minω∈Ω u (a (ω)) .
We get that for any action a ∈ L0 it holds that minP∈C Eω∼P [u (a (ω))] = minω∈Ω [u (a (ω))],
and so the Dirac distribution concentrated on ω belongs to C for every state of the world
ω ∈ Ω . Hence for any f, g ∈ Y :
f < g ⇐⇒ minP∈C Eω∼P
[
Ex∼f(ω) [u (x)]
]
> minP∈C Eω∼P
[
Ex∼g(ω) [u (x)]
]
⇐⇒ minω∈Ω Ex∼f(ω) [u (x)] > minω∈Ω Ex∼g(ω) [u (x)] .
E Proof of Lemma 13 (Bilateral trade games)
Lemma.
Let G be a bilateral trade game defined by a price function x (as, ab) and two type sets Vs
and Vt, both having a minimum and maximum.
55 Then all the MINthenMAX-NE of G
are of one of the following classes:
1. No-transaction equilibria (These equilibria exist for any two sets Vs and Vb)
In these equilibria, neither the buyer nor the seller participates (i.e., they play ⊥, or
bid a too extreme bid for all types of the other player), regardless of their valuations.
55We state the result here for the case where both sets have a minimal valuation and have a maximal
valuation. Dropping this assumption does not change the result in any essential way: some of the inequalities
are changed to strict inequalities.
32
2. One-price equilibria (These equilibria are defined only when min Vs 6 maxVb, i.e.,
when an ex-post transaction is possible.)
In a one-price equilibrium, both the seller and the buyer choose to participate for some
of their types. It is defined by a price p ∈ [minVs,maxVb] s.t. the equilibrium strategies
are:
The seller bids p for valuations vs 6 p, and ⊥ otherwise (the second clause might
be vacuously true).
The buyer bids p for valuations vb > p, and ⊥ otherwise (the second clause might
be vacuously true).
Hence, the outcome is
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Buyer
Seller
Low: vs 6 p High: vs > p
Low: vb < p no transaction no transaction
High: vb > p p no transaction
.
3. Two-price equilibria (These equilibria are defined only when minVs 6 minVb and
maxVs 6 maxVb, i.e., when there is a value for the seller s.t. an ex-post transaction
is possible for any value of the buyer, and vice versa.)
In a two-price equilibrium, all types of both the seller and the buyer choose to partici-
pate, and their bids depend on their valuations. It is defined by two prices pL < pH s.t.{
minVs 6 pL < maxVs 6 pH
pL 6 minVb < pH 6 maxVb
and the equilibrium strategies are:
The seller bids pL for valuations vs 6 pL, and pH otherwise.
The buyer bids pH for valuations vb > pH , and pL otherwise.
Hence, the outcome is
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Buyer
Seller
Low: vs 6 pL High: vs > pL
Low: vb < pH pL no transaction
High: vb > pH x (pL, pH) ∈ (pL, pH) pH
.
Proof.
We will prove that these profiles are equilibria (MINthenMAX-NE) and that they are
the only equilibria.
• No-transaction profiles
In these profiles for at least one of the players does not participate (⊥, or bids an
extreme bid) regardless of his type.
A player, facing a profile in which all the types of the other player do not participate,
is indifferent between all his actions (all of them result in no-transaction for sure), and
hence he best-responds. Facing any other profile, at least for some of his types (e.g.,
the maximal value for the buyer, and minimal value of the seller), choose to participate.
Hence, the only no-transaction profile that is an equilibrium, is when both players do
not participate.
• One-price profiles
In these profiles, both the seller and the buyer choose to participate for some of their
types, and when they choose to participate, both bid the same price p.
First, we prove that given a one-price profile as described in the lemma, it is indeed
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an equilibrium.
Consider a seller of type vs facing a profile in which there are types of the buyer that
choose p and (maybe) others that choose not to participate.
– If vs 6 p: He prefers bidding p to any bid as < p, because both bids will result in
a transaction with the same types of the buyer, but as will result in a lower price
(Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
He prefers bidding p to any bid as > p, because as will result in no-transaction
with all types of the buyer, while p results in a profitable transaction with some
of them (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
We notice that since p > minVs there are types of the seller that bid p.
– If vs > p: Any bid that results in a transaction with some types of the buyer, will
be at a price lower than vs, and hence the transaction will be a losing one. Hence,
he prefers not to participate at all (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
Similarly, consider a buyer of type vb facing a profile in which there are types of the
seller that choose p and (maybe) others that choose not to participate.
– If vb < p: Any bid that results in a transaction with some types of the seller,
will be at a price higher than vb, and hence the transaction will be a losing one.
Hence, he prefers not to participate at all (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
– If vb > p: He prefers bidding p to any bid ab > p, because both bids will result in
a transaction with the same types of the seller, but as will result in a higher price
(Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
He prefers bidding p to any bid as < p, because as will result in no-transaction
with all types of the seller, while p results in a profitable transaction with some
of them (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
We notice that since p 6 maxVb there are types of the buyer that bid p.
Next, we prove that any single-price profile other than those described in the lemma,
cannot be an equilibrium.
First we claim, that in equilibrium it cannot be that the prices of participating types
of one of the sides vary, while all types of the other player bid the same. If there is
a unique price p bid by participating types of the seller, based on the analysis above,
all participating types of the buyer bid p. Similarly, if there is a unique price p bid by
participating types of the buyer, all participating types of the seller bid p.
Hence, in a single-price profile, there exists a price p s.t. both some types of the seller
and some types of the buyer choose p, and all other types (might be an empty set)
choose not to participate.
If p ∈ [minVs,maxVb], by the analysis above, we see there is only one single-price
equilibrium supporting p.
If p /∈ [minVs,maxVb], by the analysis above, either all types of the buyer or all types
of the seller choose not to participate. In either case this is a no-transaction profile.
• All-participating profiles
In these profiles, all types of both the seller and the buyer choose to participate (did
not choose ⊥).
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First we prove that given an all-participating profile as described in the lemma as
two-price equilibria, it is indeed an equilibrium.
Consider a seller of type vs facing a profile in which all the types of the buyer partici-
pate, and let pL be the infimum of the bids chosen by types of the buyer and pH the
supremum of the bids.
– If vs 6 pL: He prefers bidding pL to any bid as < pL, because both bids will result
in a transaction with all types of the buyer, but as will result in a lower price with
each of them (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
He prefers bidding pL to any bid as > pL, because as will result in no-transaction
with some types of the buyer, while pL results in a non-losing transaction with all
of them (MINthenMAX is a refinement of MIN).
– If vs > pL and vs 6 pH : He prefers bidding pH to any bid as < pH , because
when facing the types of the buyer that bid ab ∈ [as, pH ], both bids will result in
a transaction, but as will result in a lower price, and when facing other types of
the buyer (that bid less than as), both result in no-transaction (Monotonicity of
MINthenMAX).
He prefers bidding pH to any bid as > pH , because as results in no-transaction
with all types of the buyer, while pH results in a non-losing transaction with some
types of the buyer (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
We notice that since in the profiles of the lemma satisfy min Vs 6 pL < maxVs 6 pH ,
all the types of the seller participate, there are types of the seller that bid pL, and there
are types that bid pH .
Similarly, consider a buyer of type vb facing a profile in which all the types of the seller
participate, and let pL be the infimum of the bids chosen by types of the seller and pH
the supremum of the bids.
– If vb < pH and vb > pL: He prefers bidding pL to any bid ab < pL, because ab
results in no-transaction with all types of the seller, while pL results in a non-losing
transaction with some types of the seller (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
He prefers bidding pL to any bid ab > pL, because when facing the types of the
seller that bid as ∈ [pL, ab], both bids will result in a transaction, but ab will result
in a higher price, and when facing other types of the seller (that bid more than
ab), both result in no-transaction (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
– If vb > pH : He prefers bidding pH to any bid ab < pH , because ab will result
in no-transaction with some types of the seller, while pH results in a non-losing
transaction with all of them (MINthenMAX is a refinement of MIN).
He prefers bidding pH to any bid ab > pH , because both bids will result in a
transaction with all types of the seller, but ab will result in a higher price with
each of them (Monotonicity of MINthenMAX).
We notice that since in the profiles of the lemma satisfy pL 6 minVb < pH 6 maxVb,
all the types of the buyer participate, there are types of the buyer that bid pL, and
there are types that bid pH .
Next, we prove that any all-participating non single-price profile, other than the above,
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cannot be an equilibrium.
In an all-participating non single-price profile, all the types of both the buyer and seller
participate, and for both players, not all their types choose the same price.
If there is a type of the buyer whose value is lower than any of the prices bid by types
of the seller, then this type prefers not to participate, so it cannot be an equilibrium.
Any other type of the buyer bids either the supremum of the infimum of the prices bid
by types of the seller. Given that types of the buyer bid one of two prices, if there is
a type of the seller whose value is higher than both prices, then this type prefers not
to participate, and the profile is not an equilibrium. Otherwise, the types of the seller
also bid these two prices and we get the profile is of the type described in the lemma.
• Last, we show that all other profiles are not equilibria of the game.
Assume towards a contradiction that a is an equilibrium profile of the game that is not
one of the above profile types.
Clearly, for a match of any pair of types of the seller and the buyer, the utility of
neither of them cannot be negative, because he can guarantee himself to get at least
zero against all types of the other player by choosing ⊥.
Assume there is a type vs of the seller that chose ⊥. Then for any participating type vb
of the buyer, vb cannot guarantee himself to get a utility greater than zero (his utility
from being matched with vs) in the worst case. Hence, he breaks the tie between all
the bids ab 6 vb, all giving him zero in the worst case, according to the best case which
is being matched with the lowest bid of a participating type of the seller. Hence, we
get a contradiction by showing the profile is a one-price profile.
Similarly, assume there is a type vb of the buyer that chose ⊥. Then for any partic-
ipating type vs of the seller, vs cannot guarantee himself to get a utility greater than
zero (his utility from being matched with vb) in the worst case. Hence, he breaks the
tie between all the bids ab > vs, all giving him zero in the worst case, according to the
best case which is being matched with the highest bid of a participating type of the
buyer. Hence, we get a contradiction by showing the profile is a one-price profile.
F Proof of Lemma 16 (Coordination games)
Lemma.
Let G be a coordination game and let L be a non-empty set of locations. There exists a
MINthenMAX-NE profile a s.t. L (a) = L if and only if for all i the mapping f i : T i → L
that maps a type to his best location in L is onto.
Moreover, the action profile a in which every type of every player chooses his best location
in L is the unique pure MINthenMAX-NE that satisfies L (a) = L.
Proof.
The case |L| = 1 is trivial. Let l be the location in L. The only profile satisfying
L (a) = L is when all players choose l regardless of their type, and this is an equilibrium.
The mappings f i are onto, and hence the lemma is proved for this case.
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From now on, we assume that |L| > 2. Given a profile a we define Li (a) to be the set of
locations chosen in a by player i,
Li (a) =
{
l
∣∣ ∃ti ∈ T i s.t. player i of type ti plays l in the profile a} ,
so L (a) = ∪i∈NLi (a).
⇒:
Assume there exists an equilibrium a s.t. L (a) = L.
First we claim that for all players, |Li (a)| > 1. Assume towards a contradiction, there is
a non-empty set of players S s.t. i ∈ S ⇐⇒ |Li (a)| = 1, and let p be a player in S and l
the location chosen by p.
If |S| = 1, then for any of the other players the only action guaranteeing them to meet
another player is choosing l, and hence all players choose l regardless of their type. I.e.,
L (a) = {l} and we get a contradiction.
If |S| > 1, then any of the players can guarantee himself to meet another player on the
worst case, and hence will choose a location in ∪i∈SLi (a). Since all players aim to maximize
the number of other players they meet on the worst case, it cannot be that two players in
S choose differently (both maximize the number of other players from S that choose like
them). Hence, |∪i∈SLi (a)| = 1 and we get that |L (a)| = 1. Contradiction.
Hence, for all players, |Li (a)| > 1. Player i of type ti ∈ T i cannot guarantee himself
to meet other players, and hence he will choose the best location according to his type
among the locations in ∪j 6=iLj (a) that maximize the number of other players he might meet
- m (l) = # {j 6= i | l ∈ Lj (a)}.
Next, we prove that for all players Li (a) = L (a). Assume for contradiction there exists
Player p s.t. Lp (a) ( L (a). Let l ∈ Lp (a) be a location chosen by p, and let l′ be a location
and p′ a player s.t. l′ ∈ Lp
′
(a)\Lp (a). Since Player p (of some type) chose l, we get that the
number of players j 6= p that chose l is at least as large as the number of players j 6= p that
chose the location l′. Taking the viewpoint of Player p′ we get that the number of players
j 6= p′ that chose l is strictly larger than the number of players j 6= p′ that chose the location
l′. But this is a contradiction to l′ ∈ Lp
′
(a) .
Hence, we get that in a, player i of type ti ∈ T i choose the best location according to
his type among the locations in L (in all of them he meets no-one in the worst case and
everyone else in the best case). That is, player i plays according to the function f i, and
L = Li = Im (f), so f is onto. Notice that we also get this profile is the unique equilibrium
s.t. L (a) = L.
⇐:
Assume the functions f i are onto. It is easy to verify that in the profile a in which player i
plays according to f i, player i best-responds (for all i). None of his actions guarantees him
to meet some other player in the worst case; if he plays an action a /∈ L, he does not meet
another player even in the best case; if he plays an action a ∈ L, he meets all other players
in the best case; hence, he best-responds playing according to f i.
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